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divested, whether his rights under the method of barring estates tail,
existing at the time his estate vested, is not such a substantial
absolute right in property as is protected by the constitutional
provisions. The right is defeasible it is true. But every defeasible
right has a certain value, depending on the condition or act by
which it is to be defeated. Any enlargement of the means or
condition of defeasance, abridges the right. If a deed were made
to accomplish only what was before accomplished by common recovery,
the right would remain the same as before. This is the case in
Massachusetts. There is a change without any real enlargement
of the means. The will of the tenant in tail was still left as the
condition, some matters of form only being rendered more simple
and easy.
But when a statute absolutely abolishes estates tail already vested,
there is no simple change of form in the condition determining the
nature of the remainder-man's right, but a complete abrogation of
the condition and annihilation of the right.
The constitutionality, therefore, of the statutes abolishing estates
tail, so far as they are retrospective, may be questioned.
W. W. B.
Cambridge, Hass.
RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

1n the District Court of the United States for 'Wisconsin, 1859.
In Equity.
NEWCOMB CLEVELAND VS. THE LA CROSSE AND MILWAUKEE RAILROAD
COMPANY, SELAH CHAMBERLAIN, MOSES KNEELAND AND OTHERS.

1. A deed of land by the corporation to two of its directors is void as against creditors of the corporation.
2. A lease of a railroad and rolling stock, with the power in the lessee to run the
road and to purchase additional rolling stock at his discretion, and to extend the
road out of the proceeds or revenue, the lease being for an indefinate term of
time, is void as against creditors of an insolvent company, for hindering or delaying them in the collection of their debts.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
MILLER, J.-The complainant recovered a judgment in this court

for $112,271 against this company, on the 7th October, 1857.

On
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the 22d of the same month he issued a writ of ft. fa. on the judgment ; under which was levied the rail road of the company, and all
the franchises, rights and privileges thereunto belonging and appertaining, including roads, roadways, rights of way, and real estate of
every description, station houses, buildings, and the grounds and lots,
cars, locomotive engines, &c. And also the Milwaukee and Watertown Division. And also several lots in the city of Milwaukee,
describing them.
The company, having the lots for sale, accepted a proposition of
purchase from 0. D. Nash, a person not connected with the company; and for the consideration of twenty-five thousand dollars,
part in farm mortgage bonds and part in stock of the company, the
lots were conveyed to him. This sale was brought about, and the
consideration was furnished by Moses Kneeland, a member of the
board of directors; who afterwards received the title from Nash,
and conveyed an undivided interest to James Ludington, another
member of the board. There was a large amount of testimony respecting the value of the lots ; some witnesses valuing them about
the amount of the consideration of the conveyance, some less than
that amount, and some very much higher. There was proof of large
expenditures by Kneeland and Ludington in dredging the river,
building docks, and in other permanent improvements. At the time
of this sale the complainant was a creditor of the company, as a
contractor for building a portion of the road. The bill prays a
decree that the lots be subject to the judgment and execution, and
to a sale in satisfaction of the judgment, and that Kneeland and Ludington shall convey them to the purchaser under the execution.
Directors of an incorporated company are trustees of the corporators ; and have possession of the corporate property for the corporators and the creditors of the company. All property of a corporation not sold in good faith, is liable to its creditors for the
payment of its debts. 2 Story's Ev. § 1,252; Curren vs. The

State Bank of Aqrkansas, 15 Howard, 304. Mumma vs. The Potomac Company, 8 Peters, 281-286.
cannot purchase the trust estate.

It is well settled that trustees
They are the vendors dealing
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for the interest of the corporation in making sale; the representatives of the company. Such persons cannot be permitted
to purchase, where they have a duty to perform inconsistent with
the character of purchasers. Deeds made between persons who are
not standing in the relation of vendors and purchasers, whether
directly or indirectly, are voidable, even upon a fair consideration
paid. lichaud vs. Girod, 4 Howard, 503; Hawley vs. Cramer,
4 Cowan; Tany vs. The Bank of Orleans, 9 Paige, 647; 7 Hill,
260; Grant on Corporations, 159 and notes. And the use of a gobetween is an evidence of fraud. Such deeds convey a title good
against all persons but the cestui que trust, and as to him they are
void; but he may confirm them by receipt of the purchase money,
or by release, with full knowledge of the facts. The company made
no objection to the sale after it became known that the purchase
was made for Kneeland and Ludington; but by a resolution, the
board confirmed those deeds, since this bill was filed. The question
is, whether this plaintiff, as a creditor of the company, can by this
bill and proceeding obtain a decree affecting these deeds.
If those deeds had not been made, it is clear that the lots would
be subject to levy and sale as the property of the company, under
the plaintiff's execution. And if the lots are now in equity the
property of the company, they are subject to sale in satisfaction of
the judgment, according to the law of the state. The company
might have obtained a decree vacating those deeds, and then have
turned out the lots, discharged of the apparent clouds upon the title,
for sale under this execution. This the company should have done,
after it became known that two of the directors were the purchasers.
A creditor of an insolvent corporation cannot sustain a suit at
law against the directors thereof for negligence in the management
of its affairs, whereby its property has been wasted, and its means
of paying the plaintiff destroyed. Clark vs. Lawrence, 21 Law
Reporter, 392. But a stockholder in a corporation has a remedy in
chancery against the directors; to prevent a misapplication of their
capital or profits, which might lessen the value of the shares if the
act intended to be done amount to a breach of trust or duty. Dodge
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vs. Woolsy, 18 Howard, 331. Then why should not this judgment
creditor sustain this bill against the company and directors of the
company, to have applied to his debt property which was conveyedby the company to those directors by either voidable or fraudulent
deeds, after the company has refused to discharge its duty as an
honest debtor ? It is a grave question whether these deeds should
not, under the circumstances, be considered voluntary conveyances
in fraud of creditors.
It is said, in the opinion in the case of Curren vs. Mhe State of
Ark insas, 15 Howard, on page 307-"The plaintiff is a creditor of
an insolvent banking corporation. The assets of such a corporation
are a fund for the payment of its debts. If they have been distributed among stockholders, or gone into the hands of others than
bona .fide creditors or purchasers, leaving debts of the corporation
unpaid, such holders take the property charged with the trust in
favor of creditors, which a court of equity will enforce, and compel
the application of the property to the satisfaction of their debts."
In that case the State of Arkansas, as a stockholder, by acts of the
legislature, invested itself with assets of the corporation. See 2
Story's Eq. § 1,252; Mumma vs. The Potomac Company, 8 Peters,
281; Wood vs. Plummer, 3 M11ason, 308; Wright vs. Petrie, 1
Smedes & Marshall, 319 ; iNevitt vs. The Bank, 6 Id., 513; Hightower vs. Thornton, 8 Georgia, 493; .Nathanvs. Whitbeck, 3 Ed.
Ch., 215, 9 Paige, 152; Wood vs. Grant, 15 Mass. Rep., 505;
Speer vs. Grant, 16 Mass., 9; Carson vs' African Co. 1 Yt., 121.
But if there should be any doubt of the right of the plaintiff to bring
this bill, the law of the state entirely removes it. The statute
provides, that the circuit courts of the state shall have jurisdiction
over directors, managers, trustees, and other officers of corporations,
to compel them to account for their official conduct in the management and disposition of the funds and property committed to their
charge; to order and compel payment by them to the corporation
whom they represent, and to its creditors, of all sums of money, and
of the value of all property which they may have acquired to themselves; to set aside all alienations of property made by trustees or
other officers of the corporation, contrary to the provisions of law,
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in cases where the persons receiving such alienations knew the Jourposes for which the same were made. And the jurisdiction thus
conferred may be exercised as in ordinaray cases on complaint or
petition of a creditor of the corporation. The statute is sufficiently
comprehensive to cover the case made by this bill. It is contended
on behalf of the defendants, that that law cannot be enforced by
this court; but in this I think the counsel are mistaken. The statute
laws of the state do not confer jurisdiction on the federal courts,
but those courts extend to their suitors the remedies provided by
those laws of the states wherein they are located, according to
their own rules of practice. Bxparte Biddle, 2 Mason, 472.
It is contended on behalf of the defendants, that if the lots should
be adjudged bound by plaintiff's judgment and execution ; the consideration of the purchase, and their disbursements for taxes and
improvements should be recognized as a paramount lien in equity.
With the consideration paid this plaintiff has nothing to do. He is
not such a cestui que trust as an heir, legatee or ward, -who has
received a part of the consideration to be accounted for; as in the
case7of Michaud vs. Girod, 4 Howard, 503. What they or the company did with the consideration is not a matter for inquiry. The
consideration was of rather an unusual nature, to pass between a
corporation and its directors. The company and these directors
will have to settle that matter between themselves. If the consideration had been paid in cash, and proven to have been appropriated
to the payment of legitimate debts of the company, it might possibly
be considered a paramount lien ; but I do not consider that these
defendants have any such claim. It is the duty of the court to
place these parties, as nearly as may be, in such position that, by
doing justice to one, injustice may not be done the other. For this
reason the court will order a reference to a master, to ascertain the
annual rents and income of the property, with interest; and also to
ascertain the amounts paid by these defendants for taxes, and foi
the extinguishment of liens and the actual cost of permanent
improvements made by them, with interest. The master may take
additional testimony to that on file, and he may examine these
defendants on oath touching the matter submitted to him. Upon
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the confirmation of the report, a decree will be made, so that the
proceeds of the sale of the lots may be equitably appropriated to
these parties.
This is technically a bill in aid of an execution levied; but under
the prayer for general relief, the court may decree the deeds to be
void, and may appoint a receiver to make sale of the property.
The lien of the judgment was sufficient for this purpose, without
the service of an execution. 1 Paige, 805; 4 Johns. Ch., 677;
(Jarksonvs. De Pe 1ster, 3 Paige, 320; MJatauqueBank vs. White,
2 Selden, 236.
The company and Chamberlain made a contract on the 20th Nov.
1856, for ballasting a portion of the road from Beaver Dam to
Portage city, at forty cents per yard, the company to find the
motive power. On the 20th January, 1857, they made another
contract for the construction of the road bed on the western division,
extending from Portage city to La Crosse, about one hundred and
ten miles of main line and side track, at $12,000 per mile; extra
work specified, to be paid in addition and ten per cent. to be
retained from estimates; to be paid on the completion of each thirtyfour miles. It was also agreed, that at any time during the progress
of the work, the company shall have the right to suspend the performance of the work, as it may deem expedient, and again to
require it to be resumed, without being held liable for damages for
such suspension; provided, that at least thirty days notice of such
suspension be given, and a reasonable extension of time for the
completion of the whole work, be allowed. And on the same day
the parties made a further agreement, whereby the company extended the time for completing the work contracted for, and released
Chamberlain of any claim of damages for not completing the
On the 80th of April, 1857,
work at the times specified.
the company and Chamberlain entered into a contract for tunneling the dividing ridge, instead of a through cut, at prices
largely exceeding the price specified in the original contract. On
the 20th of September, 1857, the company and Chamberlain made
two agreements in writing, under seal. In one, the parties agree
that the contract for the construction of the western division, from
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Portage city to La Crosse, of January 20th, 1857, and the supplemental contract of April 30th, 1857, be so modified, that Chamberlain shall proceed to complete the construction of the road as far as
the depot at New Lisbon, with reasonable dispatch, and by the first
of December following. The time for completing the road from
New Lisbon to La Crosse is extended indefinitely, and the road to
be constructed between these last points as fast, and no faster, than
the company shall be prepared and ready to pay in cash, on monthly
estimates. The contract of November 20th, 1856, is also modified.
And "in consideration of the extension of the time of constructing
the road from New Lisbon to La Crosse; and the damages which
Chamberlain will sustain by reason of such extension; and by loss
on teams, materials, tools, machinery, and inother ways; and also
in consideration of the mode of payment of the amount now due,
and the amount to become due to him for finishing the road to New
Lisbon; and in consideration of the failures and delays of the
company in making payment theretofore due; and ia farther
amberconsiderationof the services, risks, andpersonalexpenses of (Uh
lain in the operation and management of the road, accordirg to a
contract and lease; the company agrees to pay him two hundred
thousand dollars!" It is further agreed, "that before the 20th
October following, a full and correct statement shall be made of the
amount due to Chamberlain on the date of the agreement under the
previous contract, which, together with the said sum of $200,000,
shall be the balance due him on the 1st day of October, 1857, from
the company. And on the first day of every month thereafter,
Chamberlain shall charge the company with the amount that shall be
due under or by virtue of the said contracts, or this contract, for
constructing the road between Portage city and New Lisbon ; and
he shall credit the Company with such sums as he shall receive from
the net earnings of the road, by virtue of the contract of lease of
this date. And on the first days of July and January in each year
thereafter, a semi-annual statement of the accounts between the
parties shall be made out, in which interest shall be added to the
day of making such statement, at the rate of twelve per cent. per
annum. Whatever sums of money shall hereafter become due
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Chamberlain for work in the construction of the road between New
Lisbon and La Crosse, shall be paid by the company from means
derived from other sources than the income of the rail road."
By the other contract of the same date, the company "in consideration of the undertakings and agreements of Chamberlain, sells
and conveys to him all its personal property bf every name, kind
and description, in the State of Wisconsin, (except all such as is
used on, and is appurtenant to the operation of the Watertown
Division of the La Crosse and Milwaukee rail road,) of which an
inventory shall be taken and attached so soon as the same can be
co veniently done." "And the company, in consideration of the
said undertakings and agreements of Chamberlain, leases and lets
to him from and after the thirtieth day of September, 1857, for an
indefinite term of time, to be determined in *the manner specified, its
entire rail road and rail road route from the city of Milwaukee, by
way of Horicon and Portage City, to the city of La Crosse, together
with its right of way, depot grounds, and all buildings, tenements
and fixtures of whatever kind or description, connected therewith,
or appurtenant thereto, together with all estate, rights, privileges, appurtenances and franchises connected therewith, or belonging or incident thereto, subject only to such prior or superior liens,
as may or do exist thereon. Chamberlain shall operate so much of
the road, as is ready for operation, and from time to time such portions as shall be made ready for operation, in such manner as will
produce the largest amount of net receipts. He shall keep the
road and rolling stock in good thorough repair; and he shall receive
and appropriate all the receipts or income derived from the operations of the road. If it shall be found for the interest of the company, he may purchase additional rolling stock, and appropriate the
receipts of the road for its payment." It is then agreed that
monthly accounts shall be rendered by Chamberlain, and that the
officers of the company shall at any time have the right to examine
his accounts. Then follows a statement of coupons of prior mortgages on the road, that are to be the first paid out of the net receipts
of the road, and of the amount to be appropriated to the sinking
fund; and the residue of the net receipts shall be applied by Chain-
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berlain in payment of the amount due, or hereafter to become due
to him, by virtue of the contracts, as specified in the agreement of
this date, and also of this said agreement. And Chamberlain agrees
that whenever he shall have received from the earnings of the road
such sum as by the terms and conditions of the several contracts,
(describing them,) he is, or shall be entitled to receive; or whenever
the company shall pay him any balance he shall be entitled to, that
he will surrender up to the company the quiet and peaceable possession of the whole premises in good repair, and all rolling stock
and other personal property put on said road by him, and all personal property that shall not be worn out; and then the contract
shall cease and determine.
The bill prays that these contracts may be annulled as fraudulent;
and that Chamberlain may be enjoined from farther controlling or
running the road, and for general relief.
The answer of the company alleges that the contracts or agreements were made with the sole view and design, on its part, of vesting in Chamberlain the right of possession, enjoyment and use of all
and singular the property, rights, privileges, franchises and emoluments therein mentioned, upon the terms therein expressed, for the
purpose of securing the payment to Chamberlain of the several debts
due and owing him by the company, and as a security and as a
means of payment of a large sum of indebtedness then due and
owing him. And it denies that the contract was made with a
fraudulent intent. The answer of Chamberlain is very nearly a
duplicate of that of the company, in this respect.
On the 2d day of October, 1857, and during the trial of the plaintiff's suit at law against this company, the company confessed a
judgment to Chamberlain, in this court, for six hundred and twentynine thousand and eighty-nine dollars. It is alleged in the bill, that
the company did not then owe him exceeding fifty thousand dollars;
and that the judgment was confessed to hinder or delay creditors,
and is fraudulent. The bill prays that the judgment be vacated.
Mr. Kilbourn, the president of the company, testified that he was
present, and acted in the board when the judgment was confessed,
and when the lease was given. Chamberlain was anxious for security
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for his debts; he thought he was incurring too large responsibilities
on uncertainties. The company gave him assurances of security, as
the great point with the company was the completion of the road.
As September and October approached, the company was getting
deeper into embarrassments. An association of bond holders was
threatening the company, and he saw but one way to save the road
and secure its ultimate completion, which was to make the lease to
Chamberlain. The board came to the same conclusion; and the
lease was made. The only remaining hope for the continuance of
the work on the road, seemed to be, to give Chamberlain such a lien
on it as would assure the payment of what had already become due
for the work then done, as well as for that to be done under the
contract. This was the great and paramount danger which threatened
to overwhelm the company; but there were other and nearer dangers
threatening the company more immediately, against which it was
equally necessary to guard. One or two attachments had been
issued against the company, for a few hundred dollars, and it seemed
quite evident that by such means the company's resources would
soon be so exhausted as to render it entirely powerless for further
progress. The floating debt of the company then amounted to
$300,000 in small sums, whici, if sued under the panic, would
have effectually arrested the progress of the work, an& prevented
the completion of the road. At the time of giving the lease, the
amount of indebtedness to Chamberlain was not known. It was the
intention of the company to give him a perfect lien on the road and
its earnings; to secure all indebtedness accrued. and.accruing under
his contracts, until the whole amount should be paid; and such was
one of the conditions of the lease, without reference to the specific
amount. The amount of indebtedness. at that time, or any other
time, was not a necessary element of the lease. The reason why
the judgment was ordered by the board, he understood to be, in
consequence of a doubt entertained.by the counsel of Chamberlain,
whether more legal difficulties might not be raised, as to his lease
lien covering the iron not laid down on the rcad; and to avoid all
questions in that respect, anadin.part to render the transaction so
regarded a lien, as perfect, as-possible; and to accomplish the ends
85
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proposed to be secured by it, it was deemed advisable by the board,
under advice of counsel, to give the force of a judgment in support
of the previous lien, for the amounts then reported to be due by the
chief engineer, whose statement was considered conclusive by the
company. Cleveland's suit was then pending. It was rather a
hurrying time with the company. Other matters were pressing.
Chamberlain first suggested the judgment. It had particular reference to the iron which Vose, Livingston & Co. were endeavoring
to reclaim. He wanted, first, to secure the completion of the road;
second, to secure the Wisconsin stockholders. In order to secure
these objects, he deemed it necessary to give the lease and judgment
before Cleveland got his judgment; and he explained his views to
the board. The iron was to be devoted to the use of the road, and
Chamberlain was to have the use of the road to secure him. The
agreement was understood to be, that the iron was to be laid on the
road. So far as any thing was said by Chamberlain, it was evident
that his motive was to secure payment of the debts due and accruing to him from the company. The judgment was for a specific
amount then due, as reported by the chief engineer. The leading
object of the directors was the completion of the road. The judgment was not in derogation of the lease, but to carry out its objects.
There was no understanding, when Chamberlain proposed that the
judgment should be given, that it should be used in any way inconsistent with the completion of the road. Probably Chamberlain's
object in proposing the judgment was not only to protect himself
against Vose, Livingston & Co., but also against Cleveland's claim.
In our conversations with Chamberlain the principal matters talked
of was his security. It was understood that he should go on with
the work. The allowance of $200,000 to Chamberlain was not
included in the judgment.
A great amount of testimony was submitted on this subject, and
on the amount of indebtedness of the company to Chamberlain,
which is not necessary to be here stated.
The company is authorized by its charter "to make such covenants, contracts and agreements, as the execution and management
of the work, and the convenience and interests of the company may
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require." And it is "empowered to borrow money at any rate of
interest, and to make all necessary writings, notes, bonds, mortgages,
or other papers and securities, in amount and kind as may be deemed
expedient, or in discharge of any liabilities that it may incur in the
construction, repair, equipment'or running of said road." The lease
to Chamberlain was intended as a security, in the kind or nature
deemed expedient for liabilities incurred, and to be incurred, in the
construction, repair, equipment and running of the road. The company, by virtue of the general powers vested in it as a corporation,
has all the powers contained in this provision of the charter. It
does not materially enlarge the general power of the grant to contract and be contracted with. It was not intended to embrace a
contract for a transfer, or lease of all the franchises of the company
for an unlimited term. The powers and privileges granted to the
company-are in many respects unusual and extraordinary; but
unless so expressed, public policy and the rights of creditors should
exclude any such construction of the charter as to sanction this
lease.
The law of the State empowers rail road companies to borrow
money and to execute trust deeds, or mortgages, or both, on rail roads
constructed, or in process of construction, for the sums borrowed or
owing, upon such terms and in such manner as the company shall
deem expedient; and the company may make such provisions in the
trust deed or mortgage for pledging or transferring their rail road
track, right of way, depot grounds, rights, privileges, immunities,
machine house, rolling stock, furniture, tools, implements, appendages
and appurtenances belonging to or used in connection with such railroad, in any manner whatever, as security for any bonds, debts or
sums of money that may be secured by such trust deed or mortgage.
And in case of the sale on such mortgages or trust deeds, the purchasers shall acquire and shall exercise and enjoy all and the same
rights, privileges, grants, franchises, immunities and advantages in
the mortgage, or trust deed enumerated and conveyed, as fully
as the corporation, shareholders, officers and agents of the company
might or could have done. And the purchasers may proceed to
organize anew and elect directors, distribute and dispose of stock,
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take the same or another name, and may conduct their business
generally under and in the manner provided in the charter, with
such variations in manner and form of organization as their altered
circumstances and better organization may seem to require; but not
greater or enlarged powers shall be exercised by the new organization. These laws establish the policy of the State in regard to the
power of railroad companies to mortgage their roads; and they
relieve the court of all embarrassment on that subject. By the laws
of this State, railroad companies and individuals are placed on an
equality in respect to their mortgages.
The two agreements of the 26th September 1857, must be considered as one. They are so intimately connected, that they might
have been embraced in one agreement.
It is contended that the defeasance gives the agreement the
character of a mortgage; but without it the company would have
the equitable right to regain possession by discharging its liabilities
to Chamberlain. .Nugent vs. Riley, 1 Mete. 117 ; Erskine vs.
Townsend, 2 Mass. 493; Hughes vs. Edwards, 9 Wheaton, 489;
1 White & Tudor's Cases, 510; Hilliard on Mort. 22; Conway vs.
Alexander, 7 Cranch, 218; Morris vs. Nixon, 1 Howard, 118;
Russell vs. ,Southerd, 12 Id. 189; .qriggvs. Te Bank, 14 Peters,
201, Conrad vs. The At. Ins. Co. 1 Peters, 386; Redfield on Railroads, 584, 585, and cases cited.
A court of equity will look to the substantial object of the conveyance, and will consider an absolute deed a mortgage whenever it
is shown to have been intended merely as a security for the payment of a debt; and the grantee may maintain a bill to foreclose the
equity of the grantor. But Chamberlain could not proceed in equity
to foreclose on this agreement, if he had not been placed in possession. I apprehend his remedy would then have been at law upon
the contract. It. was not given nor received as a security for money
borrowed; but as a security for a debt accruing and to accrue, with
a transfer of possession of the premises. If possession had not been
delivered to Chamberlain, I know of no means he had for enforcing
a foreclosure, or of acquiring possession. But being placed in possession he may be proceeded against by a bill at the suit of the
company to redeem, and for an account.
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Technically this agreement is not a mortgage. It is an assignment to a preferred creditor, with a lease for the mutual interest ofthe parties. If this were a mere assignment of a part of the property
of the company, it might, if bonafide,be adjudged as a mortgage of
the property transferred, so that the residuary interest of the grantor may be reached by execution, or by a bill in equity, as in Leitak
vs. Hollister, 4 Comstock, 211. A debtor has a right to prefer one
creditor to another in payment; and his private motives for giving
the preference cannot effect the exercise of the right, if the preferred
creditor has done nothing improper to procure it; but any unlawful
consideration moving from the preferred creditor, to induce the preference, will avoid the deed which gives it. Marbery vs. Brooks,
7 Wheaton, 556. And it is no objection to such an assignment,
that it defeats other creditors of their legal remedies. Brooks vs.
Marbery, 11 Wheaton, 223. A debtor may lawfully apply his
property to the payment of the debts of such creditors as he may
choose to prefer; and he may select the time for doing it, so as to
make it effectual. Such preference must necessarily operate to the
prejudice of creditors not provided for, and cannot furnish any
evidence of fraudulent intention. And such assignments may be
made direct to the creditor. Tompkins vs. Hughes, 10 Peters, 106.
It is not a legal objection to this agreement as an assignment, that
it was made during the trial of the plaintiff's cause against the company, and before judgment was rendered. So long as a person or
corporation is the owner of property unincumbered, an assignment
may be made for the payment of debts, giving preferences where
there is no statute law prohibiting it, as in this State. But where
fraud is alleged, the time, the occasion, and the inducement for
making the assignment are proper subjects for consideration.
Under the pecuniary embarrassments of the company, the assignment was made to Chamberlain, as a security for a debt partly
accrued and partly to accrue, in building the road to New Lisbon.
The whole road from Milwaukee to La Crosse is embraced in the
lease, while a great portion of it was not then completed. There is
no doubt, from the testimony of the witnesses, and from the face of
the agreement, that the intent of the parties was to prevent the
creditors of the company from further interfering with, or inter-
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rupting its operations. Chamberlain obtained a preference over
other creditors, for a debt then existing; and he acquired possession
of the whole property of the company, with which to carry on the
business of the company. And while increasing the amount of his
debt against the company, he enjoys the exclusive possession and
control of its property for an indefinite period of time; subject to
the duty of rendering an account semi-annually, showing his balance
against the company, on which he draws interest at the rate of
twelve per cent per annum. In operating the road and in supplying rolling stock, at his discretion, he is substituted for the directory
of the company. For an indefinite period of time he is the company for all practical purposes.
Assignments of insolvent debtors, giving unlimited discretion to
the assignee, cannot be sustained against creditors.
Assignments must be absolute and specific in their directions;
and not coupled with trusts not authorized by law. 7 Paige, 568 ;
Boardman vs. .olliday, 10 Id. 223. Nor can such an assignment
be used as a device to continue the business of the assignor uninterrupted by his creditors. -Ewen vs. Brady, 5 Ad. & Ellis, 28, Am.
-Ex. Bank vs. fulees, 7 Md. 380. And a debtor cannot make a
reservation at the expense of his creditors, of any part of his income
or property, for his own benefit; nor can he stipulate for any advantage to himself. Green vs. Trieber, 3 Md. 11. Assignment must
be made in good faith, for the purpose of paying debts, and without
any intent to lock up the property from other creditors for the use
of the debtor. *A conveyance of the owner in trust for himself, is
in effect a conveyance to himself; and the grantor in such deed can
have but one motive, and that must be to hinder or delay the claims
of creditors. The law does not tolerate any hindrance in assignments for the benefit of creditors, beyond what may be necessary
for the purposes of the assignment. And any stipulation in a deed,
which materially hinders or delays the rights of creditors, renders
it void. A deed of assignment authorizing the assignee to sell the
assigned property on credit, is void as to creditors, on account of the
delay. Hfenderson vs. Griffin, 2 Comstock, 365. A transfer of
property, which creates a trust, whether secret or avowed, in favor

CLEVELAND vs. RAILROAD COMPANY.

of the grantor, renders the transaction fraudulent and void in legal
contemplation, even though there may be mingled with it provisions
in favor of preferred creditors. ,Shaffer vs. Watkins, 7 Sergt. &
Rawle, 219. In the case under consideration the time for executing
the assignment is unlimited; to be terminated only by the payment
of the assignee's accrued and accruing debt by the insolvent company, or out of the avails and proceeds of the property and business
of the company. The whole profits, beneficial interest, enjoyment
and control of the road and property of the company passed to this
preferred creditor, with powers to manage and run the road, and to
purchase additional stock at his discretion. The direct tendency,
as well as the avowed paramount object, was to carry on the business of the company, and to pay the assignee and preferred creditor
out of the profits. The cases of Arthur vs. The Commercial Bank
of Viccsburg, 9 Smedes & Marshall, 394, and Bradley vs. Goodrich,
7 Howard, 276, are irresistible authorities for determining this case
against the defendant Chamberlain. The Commercial and Rail road
Bank of Vicksburg assigned all its property to trustees, reciting
that "The embarrassed situation of the bank and the present inability of its debtors to meet their liabilities, and by consequence, that
the bank was unable to pay its debts promptly, rendered it necessary that a general assignment should be made for the benefit of its
creditors and the completion of the rail road ;" it therefore assigned
all its property to trustees, with authority to sell the effects assigned,
to collect all debts due to the institution, and to complete the rail road;
for which they were authorized to borrow a sum not exceeding
$250,000 ; and out of the proceeds collected, to pay the principal
and interest of the loan. After that, dividends were to be made
pro rata among the creditors. ' The trustees to receive eight thousand
dollars each per annum for their services. The Supreme Court of the
United States decided "that the deed was fraudulent and void as
against creditors of the bank. That the deed showed on its face an
intention of the bank to postpone its creditors, use the effects of the
bank for the completion of the rail road, pay the trustees enormous
salaries, and make no dividends among the creditors until the object
was accomplished." The deed in that case made some show of
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regard for the rights of creditors, but the deed in this case only
contemplates a benefit to the parties, the insolvent assignor, and the
preferred assignee. How much salary was allowed Chamberlain in
the $200,000 is not specified, but from the recklessness exhibited
on the part of the directors, it may be presumed to be enormous.
The whole recital of items comprising that amount, strikes me as
extraordinary and enormous, after Chamberlain's original contract
price for building the road had been extravagantly enhanced, and
while he had in his hands funds of the company amounting to nearly
$150,000, which the directors did not require to be accounted for
or applied. And it is questionable whether under the circumstances,
Chamberlain was entitled to any damages for the temporary suspension of the work west of New Berlin.
The principles here stated apply to assignments direct to a preferred creditor, as well as to those in trust for creditors. .MeClurg
vs. Lackey, 3 Penn. Rep. 83; Passmore vs. Aldridge, 12 Sergt. &
Rawle, 198.
The assignment and lease to Chamberlain will be decreed to be
void as against this complainant.
The defendant Chamberlain in his answer denies that the judgment confessed by the company in his favor was based on any fictitious consideration, or was given and accepted with any intent or
design to hinder or delay, or defraud the creditors of the company;
but on the contrary, he says that it was given for effectual indebtedness from the company to him. And he claims that the amount of
work done for the company under his contracts exceeds the amount of
the judgment. In the testimony of the witnesses there is very great
discrepancy as to the amount of work done, and also as to the prices
that should be paid. One thing, however, is beyond dispute; that
the amount included in the judgment far exceeds the amount he
would be entitled to on his original contract. The company might
increase his compensation within reasonable bounds, without incurring the imputation of fraud. In pursuance of the agreement
between Chamberlain and the company in the month of December
1857, for re-measuring the work, for the purpose of ascertaining the
amount due him on the 1st of October, 1857, a survey and estimate
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were made, which showed an amount greater than that of the judgment. If that survey and estimate had been made on notice to the
complainant, more reliance could be placed on the evidence upon
that subject. Neither that survey nor the one for the complainant
can be accurate, on account of ihe length of time the work had been
done. Chamberlain may not be entitled to anything near the amount
of the judgment. But liberality on the part of the company should
not be considered fraudulent, unless it be so excessive as to bring
the mind to that conclusion, after an examination into all the circumstances. This is not a suit of Chamberlain against the company on
the contracts, requiring a legal enquiry into the amount due him;
but the only question for our consideration is whether the judgment
is fraudulent as against creditors. The judgment was confessed a
few days after the assignment, while the company was laboring
under its pecuniary embarrassments. The testimoney of Mr. Kilbourn is, " that the judgment was suggested by Chamberlain and his
counsel. That it had particular reference to the iron Vose, Livingston & Co. were endeavoring to reclaim. The completion of the
road first, and securing Chamberlain, were the objects of the company, and they deem it necessary to give the lease and the judgment
before Cleveland should get a judgment. The judgment was not in
derogation of the lease, but to carry out the object of the lease.
Probably Chamberlain's object in proposing the judgment was not
only to protect himself against Vose, Livingston & Co., but also
against Cleveland's claim."
The confession of a judgment to a bona fide creditor, even though
it have the effect of giving him a preference over other creditors, is
not a fraudulent disposition of an insolvent estate. While there is
no statute prohibiting it, an insolvent debtor has a right to give
preference to his creditors by confessing judgments. But if such
judgments are given and received for the purpose of hindering or
delaying creditors, they are voidable as against those creditors, if
even for a bona fide debt, and if not used for that purpose. When
a judgment is given and received for a fraudulent purpose, the giving the judgment is such an act done in pursuance of the fraudulent
purpose, as to render it voidable by any person -who is in a position
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as-a creditor, to question it. And such a judgment, originally given
for the purpose of defrauding creditors, cannot even be used as
against such creditors, to collect the amount due to the party to
whom it was given. Bunn vs. AN, 5 Casey, 387. If Chamberlain
had merely demanded and received the judgment, even to the known
delay of Cleveland and the other pressing creditors of the company,
it would not be legally invalid as against them. But would the
judgment have been demanded and given, after the assignment and
lease, but for the purpose of forestalling Vose, Livingston & Co., in
reclaiming the iron, which the interests of Chamberlain and the
company required should be laid on the track of the road ; or to
further the paramount object of the assignment and lease'? The
suits of Vose, Livingston & Co., respecting the iron, and the two
contracts of settlement between them and Chamberlain and the company,.show that they were pressing a claim for the iron, which was
compromised by those contracts. So far it appears that Vose,
Livingston & Co. had a claim, to effect which the judgment was
demanded. But be this as it may, it appears satisfactorily that
the judgment was given and received as part of the arrangements
to secure the future operations of the company and Chamberlain, in
the prosecution of the work towards completion, while the creditors
of the company should be hindered or delayed for an indefinite time;
and it must fall under the same condemnation as the assignment and
lease.
The assignment and lease to D. C. Freeman, of the Milwaukee
and Watertown Division, having expired by its own limitation, it is
not necessary to make any decree against him, except that he pay
his share of the costs.
The plaintiff is left now to pursue his legal remedies against the
company on his execution.

